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Impacts of a measles outbreak in western Sydney on public health resources
Abstract
During February and March 2011, an outbreak of 26 confirmed cases of measles was reported to the
Parramatta Public Health Unit (PHU) in western Sydney. This paper describes the impact of the outbreak
on PHU resources. A retrospective review of information obtained from case notification forms and
associated contact tracing records was carried out for each of the confirmed cases. Seven cases (27%)
required hospital admission for more than 1 day and 10 (38%) cases required management within a
hospital emergency department. There were no cases of encephalitis or death. The number of contacts
was determined for each case as well as the number who required post-exposure prophylaxis. In total,
1,395 contacts were identified in this outbreak. Of these, 79 (5.7%) required normal human
immunoglobulin and 90 (6.5%) were recommended to receive the measles-mumps-rubella vaccine. A
case study detailing the PHU costs associated with the contact management of a hospitalised measles
case with 75 identified contacts is also included and the estimated total cost to the PHU of containing
this particular case of measles was A$2,433, with staff time comprising the major cost component.
Considerable effort and resources are required to manage measles outbreaks. The total cost of this
outbreak to the PHU alone is likely to have exceeded A$48,000.
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Impacts of a measles outbreak in western
Sydney on public health resources
Kristina L Flego, Daniel A Belshaw, Vicky Sheppeard, Kathryn M Weston

Abstract
During February and March 2011, an outbreak of
26 confirmed cases of measles was reported to
the Parramatta Public Health Unit (PHU) in western
Sydney. This paper describes the impact of the
outbreak on PHU resources. A retrospective review
of information obtained from case notification
forms and associated contact tracing records was
carried out for each of the confirmed cases. Seven
cases (27%) required hospital admission for more
than 1 day and 10 (38%) cases required management within a hospital emergency department.
There were no cases of encephalitis or death. The
number of contacts was determined for each case
as well as the number who required post-exposure
prophylaxis. In total, 1,395 contacts were identified
in this outbreak. Of these, 79 (5.7%) required normal human immunoglobulin and 90 (6.5%) were
recommended to receive the measles-mumpsrubella vaccine. A case study detailing the PHU
costs associated with the contact management
of a hospitalised measles case with 75 identified
contacts is also included and the estimated total
cost to the PHU of containing this particular case
of measles was A$2,433, with staff time comprising the major cost component. Considerable effort
and resources are required to manage measles
outbreaks. The total cost of this outbreak to the
PHU alone is likely to have exceeded A$48,000.
Commun Dis Intell 2013;37(3):E240–E245.

Keywords: measles, disease outbreaks,
contact tracing, measles vaccine, health costs,
immunisation programs
Introduction
Although Australia has declared itself to have
eliminated measles,1 imported cases continue to
occur with occasional outbreaks involving local
transmission amongst under-immunised groups.
An outbreak of 26 cases of measles occurred within
1 local government area in western Sydney, New
South Wales in February and March of 2011.
This paper describes the impact of a measles
outbreak on public health unit (PHU) resources.
A case study that estimates the monetary costs to
the PHU associated with contact management for
1 measles case is included.
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Background
On 4 February 2011, a case of measles in a 12-yearold girl was reported to the Parramatta PHU. She
had not travelled recently and no source case was
identified; however guests from Samoa had stayed
with her family in the preceding weeks. Eleven
days later, measles was notified in an 18-monthold girl, also of Samoan background but without
recent travel, and with whom the index case had
occasional social contact although apparently not
within the estimated infectious period for the index
case. Two additional cases were notified at this
time; one was a 20-year-old non-Samoan woman
with no recent travel history and the other was a
15-year-old boy of Samoan background. Neither of
these cases reported any epidemiological connection to either of the other 2 cases.
During the next 5 weeks a further 22 confirmed
cases of measles were reported, three of which
were acquired overseas (Philippines). None of the
cases had documented evidence of having received
2 doses of a measles-containing vaccine (MCV).
Two cases were recorded on the Australian
Childhood Immunisation Register (ACIR) as having received 1 dose of the measles-mumps-rubella
(MMR) vaccine. In 4 other cases, a parent stated
that their child had been vaccinated against measles but this could not be verified.2
Methods
A review of the notification and case-investigation
records for each confirmed case and their contacts
was conducted, specifically examining the impact
on public health resources. According to the NSW
Health guidelines, a confirmed case of measles
requires laboratory evidence (measles virus isolation or detection by nucleic acid testing or measles
IgG seroconversion or measles-virus specific IgM
antibody detection) or clinical evidence and an
epidemiological link.3
The Measles Investigation Forms completed for
each case during the outbreak were reviewed. The
forms contained information obtained from cases,
their carers, other associated contacts, and clinicians.
Details recorded included patient demographics, symptoms and onset dates, illness outcomes
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Results
Twenty-six confirmed cases of measles were
reported to the PHU between 4 February and
29 March 2011 (Figure). The age of cases ranged
between 8 months and 35 years and all cases
resided within a single local government area of
New South Wales. The mean and median delay

Figure: Epidemic curve of measles outbreak,
western Sydney, January to March 2011, by
onset date and place of acquisition
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Contacts that were unable to be contacted by phone
were sent a letter informing them of their potential
exposure to measles, advising on measles signs and
symptoms and what to do if they suspected they
were developing the disease.

As this work was conducted as part of routine
public health control activities, review by a human
research ethics committee was not required.

8/2/2011

The total number of contacts for each case
(including household contacts) and the number
who required NHIG were recorded. PHU staff
followed-up each contact to ensure that PEP was
administered as per the protocol. An estimate of
the number of contacts for whom MMR was recommended is provided; but some contacts chose
the option of double-checking their vaccination
history before seeking MMR vaccination. In these
cases, there was no follow-up to confirm receipt of
the vaccine. Wherever possible, NHIG and MMR
were provided at the place where contacts were
exposed to the infectious case (i.e. hospital emergency department or general practice).

The cost to follow up 1 contact was estimated by
dividing the costs for following up contacts of this
case by the number of contacts for the case. The
total cost of contact follow up to the PHU for the
outbreak was estimated by multiplying the cost for
1 contact by the total number of identified contacts
and adding the staffing cost for a high school vaccination clinic that formed part of the outbreak
response.

1/2/2011

Contacts were telephoned and asked about their
measles vaccination status and any history of measles infection. Those born after 1965 who were not
age-appropriately vaccinated against measles and
who had not previously been infected with measles virus were offered post-exposure prophylaxis
(PEP). This was either the MMR vaccine (up to
72 hours post-exposure) or normal human immunoglobulin (NHIG) (4 to 6 days post-exposure or
for contacts with contraindications to MMR vaccine). PEP is not considered effective after 6 days
(144 hours) post-exposure and so generally is not
offered after this time4 but efforts were still made to
inform all contacts about their potential exposure
regardless of whether prophylaxis was warranted.
For infants under 6 months of age whose mother’s
measles immunity status was unclear, a maternal
measles serum immunoglobulin G (IgG) level
was urgently requested and results followed-up by
PHU staff. A positive measles IgG negated the use
of NHIG in both mother and child.

25/1/2011

Contact tracing records were also reviewed.
Contact tracing and management was performed
by PHU staff as per the NSW Health guidelines.3
Whenever a healthcare setting was identified
as the site of exposure, any person who shared a
waiting area with a case or was in the waiting or
consultation room up to 2 hours after the case during the infectious period for the case was classified
as a contact. Names and contact details for staff
and patients meeting the above definition were
collected by staff from the healthcare setting and
provided to the PHU.

A case study was conducted to describe the costs of
following up contacts of 1 particular hospitalised
case of measles. Data were prospectively gathered
on the time spent by PHU staff identifying and
telephoning contacts, arranging testing and PEP,
and other tasks associated with contact tracing. Staff
costs were calculated according to their level and it
was assumed that all staff members were paid at the
top increment for their award. A log of letters, faxes,
and phone calls was kept and costed according to
the standard rate charged by the local health district. Pathology costs were actual costs billed by the
laboratory for tests ordered by the PHU. A follow-up
telephone call to each contact was made 2 weeks
later to determine whether any illness had arisen.
Hospital medical records were reviewed to identify
any visit to hospital made by contacts who could not
be reached for follow-up by telephone.

Number of cases

(hospitalisation or death), potential exposures, and
details of contacts (usually household) and their
management. Complication and hospitalisation
rates for cases were calculated using information
recorded on the Measles Investigation Form.

Onset date
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between onset of rash and notification was 2 days
(range 2–8 days) and the mean and median delay
between onset of illness and notification was 5 days
(range 1–9 days).
Seven (27%) cases required admission to hospital
for longer than 1 day. A further 10 (38%) cases were
managed within a hospital emergency department. For all cases, the most common presenting
symptom in addition to fever, cough, coryza, conjunctivitis and rash, was diarrhoea (23%). One case
was diagnosed with pneumonitis. Another case
experienced recurrent epistaxis requiring nasal
packing although this was a pre-existing problem
and was most likely exacerbated by, rather than
a direct consequence of, measles. There were no
other serious complications, including no deaths.
In total, 1,395 contacts were identified and managed
by PHU staff. The average number of contacts per
case was 54 (median 28). The maximum number
of contacts for a single case was 206. Most contacts
resulted from cases visiting large and busy general
practice clinics, often on multiple occasions. Many
contacts attended healthcare facilities with one or
more companions, increasing the total number of
contacts beyond those included on the initial list
supplied by the healthcare facility (Table 1).

Table 1: Number of contacts identified during
the measles outbreak, by exposure category
Household

General
practice

Emergency
department

Other*

Total

161

889

283

62

1,395

*
Other includes settings such as airplane and social.

Of the identified contacts, 1,241 were contacted
by telephone and 154 who could not be contacted
by telephone were sent a letter. Interviews identified 169 potentially susceptible contacts, of whom
79 were given NHIG and 90 were recommended
to receive the MMR vaccine. There were no secondary cases amongst the contacts given PEP.
Ten cases attended a single high school and had
onset dates covering a 15-day period. The absence
of any other epidemiological link between these
cases suggested that the entire school population was at risk. Further, none of these cases had
documentation of having received a MCV, raising
concern that under-vaccination was widespread in
this population. In collaboration with the school,
a decision was made after notification of the 4th
case to hold a mass MMR immunisation clinic at
the school for all staff and students who did not
have documented evidence of 2 doses of a MCV.
The clinic was held 7 days later and was run by
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10 nursing staff and 2 medical staff from the PHU.
Of the total population of 1,150 students and
100 staff, 492 students (43%) and 42 staff (42%)
were vaccinated. The major cost of this clinic from
the PHU perspective was attributed to nursing
staff salaries (A$2,590) although the total cost of
vaccine was almost 3 times this figure. However,
the cost of the vaccine was not met by the PHU
as it was funded by the NSW Ministry of Health.
A case study conducted for a single case estimated
that the cost to the PHU of following this case was
A$2,433 (Box). It can be estimated that the total
cost to the PHU of contact management for the
entire outbreak was at least A$48,000.

Box: Case study on Public Health Unit costs
for responding to a single case of measles
The PHU received a call at 15:15 hours, 8 March
2011 about a 35-year-old pregnant patient with
measles serology IgM positive and IgG negative,
who had been an inpatient on the antenatal ward
for the past 7 days. Six PHU staff were assigned
to manage the response to the case. Seventy-five
patient contacts were identified by the hospital
for follow-up by PHU staff.
All contacts of the case were notified through:
telephone (42), letter (25), email (7) and fax (1).
Five contacts required serology to confirm current immunity, 1 contact required MMR vaccine
and two required urgent NHIG. A total of 49
hours personnel time over 3 days was spent to
follow-up the contacts of this single case of measles. This ranged from 3.5 hours to 17 hours per
staff member assigned to the case. The average
time spent per contact was 38 minutes.
Seventy per cent of the 75 contacts (n=52) were
reached by a follow-up telephone call 2 weeks
later. The medical records of the remaining 30%
were reviewed. No secondary cases of measles
were identified among the contacts.
The costs of all components of the response are
listed in Table 2. Only costs borne by the PHU are
included and other costs such as MMR vaccine
and NHIG which are borne by other parts of the
health sector (New South Wales Government)
are excluded. Staff represented 90% of the total
cost to the PHU of responding to this case. This
is similar to the estimate derived in Iowa in 2004,
where once overheads and the costs of the MMR
vaccine and NHIG were removed, over 90% of
measles containment costs to the PHU were
attributed to staff.5
The cost to the PHU for this 1 case of measles
was A$2,433 with staff representing the major
cost component of a public health response.
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Table 2: Public health unit costs for
responding to a single case of measles
Item
Pathology
Telephone/mobile
Stationery and mail

Cost (A$2011)

% of total

158

6.5

59

2.4

24

1.0

Staff

2,194

90.1

Total

2,434

100.0

Genotyping of measles viruses was performed
by the Victorian Infectious Diseases Research
Laboratory in Melbourne, Australia. The
D9 genotype (prevalent in South East Asia, Japan
and Turkey in 20116) was isolated from 7 cases,
all of whom had definite epidemiological links to
15 other cases where genotyping was not requested.
D8 (prevalent in India and the Arabian peninsula
in 20116) was isolated from 1 case, indicating it
was an unrelated sporadic case. No source could
be identified for this case, and no secondary cases
arose. None of the imported cases (all from The
Philippines) were able to be genotyped.
Following containment of this outbreak in
March 2011, no further cases of measles were
notified in western Sydney until measles was reintroduced by a returning traveller in April 2012.
Discussion
This outbreak was largely sustained by the clustering of susceptible people within a single high
school. The lack of evidence of any doses of a
MCV for most cases underscores the importance
of MMR vaccine in controlling this disease.
Timeliness of notification, and in some cases, the
time required to prepare lists of contacts directly
impacted the type of control measures that could
be undertaken. Late notifications increased the
potential need for NHIG and very late notifications precluded the use of any PEP. The poor specificity of prodromal signs and symptoms coupled
with clinician inexperience with measles resulted
in delayed notification, whilst the moderately
severe nature of the illness resulted in recurrent
presentations to healthcare facilities, generating
more potential contacts.
A significant issue for PHU management was
poor documentation of vaccination history as well
as confusion arising from changes to the measles
vaccination schedule over the past 3 decades. Since
1996, the ACIR has been used to record the vaccination history of all Australian children up to
their 7th birthday, and this was used to check the
CDI
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vaccination history of all contacts up to 15 years of
age.7 No centralised vaccination recording system
exists for older individuals, including for vaccines
administered in school-based measles control programs. Contacts may have remembered ‘getting
all their needles at school’ but their immunisation
documents were not always accessible to PHU
staff. A reported history of measles infection was
assumed to be correct. Contacts born before 1966
were assumed to have experienced natural infection but still needed to be contacted to determine
whether they might be immunosuppressed and
whether they had been accompanied by younger
(and potentially susceptible) people at the time.
With the frequent lack of documentation, it is
possible that some recipients of measles PEP had
previously received 2 doses of a MCV.
There has been recent discussion in Australia
about considering the use of childcare and primary
school entry as a trigger to review vaccination
status. Such a measure may be helpful in future
measles contact tracing activities, as children who
had attended childcare or school in New South
Wales would be more likely to have up-to-date
ACIR records.
A 2-dose MMR schedule has been officially recommended in Australia since 1992.8 In addition,
between 1992 and 2000 a number of schedule
changes and catch-up programs targeting schoolaged children and young adults were undertaken.
These programs complicated the risk assessment
for contacts who could not provide written vaccination records. A useful tool for assessing vaccination
status was a table that listed annual birth cohorts
from 1966 until 1994 and which drew on historical
knowledge of vaccination policy to predict whether
a 2nd dose of a MCV had been offered and in which
setting. If a contact stated that they received all of
their school vaccinations and a 2nd dose MMR
vaccine had been offered to their birth cohort when
they were in school then receipt of a 2nd dose of a
MCV was assumed. These strategies of assuming
2-dose vaccination or a history of disease appeared
to be justified when evidenced by the lack of secondary cases reported amongst identified contacts
that were assessed as not requiring PEP.
On several occasions, pregnant contacts required
PEP. Measles infection during pregnancy has
been associated with an increased risk of maternal and foetal complications including pre-term
delivery and foetal loss.9 Pregnant women who
have received 2 doses of a MCV in their lifetime
are considered protected and do not require any
form of PEP under normal circumstances; however, for those with uncertain vaccination history
or known susceptibility to measles, NHIG is indicated as MCVs are contraindicated in pregnancy.
E243
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Since many women of childbearing age are in the
age group that is most likely to be susceptible to
measles in Australia (born after 1965, but prior to
introduction of the 2-dose schedule), the addition
of routine antenatal testing for measles immune
status along with rubella immunity, would be useful. If undertaken prior to pregnancy, vaccination
could then be provided if required.
One hundred and fifty-four contacts (11%) required
a letter to inform them of measles exposure. The
delay in providing these contacts with information
would have excluded them from the possibility of
receiving PEP if it was required. Despite this, no
secondary cases amongst this group were notified
to the PHU, probably reflecting high levels of
immunity in the general population.
The case study provides an approximation of the
monetary costs incurred by the PHU in response
to a single case of measles. By calculating a ‘cost
per contact’ and multiplying this figure by the total
number of contacts, then adding the cost of staffing
the mass vaccination clinic held at the high school,
it can be estimated that the total cost of contact
management for the entire outbreak was in excess
of A$48,000 (2011 A$) from the PHU perspective
alone. In reality, the ‘cost per contact’ as calculated
from this case study probably underestimates the
true ‘cost per contact’ compared with situations
where exposure occurred at a general practice or
hospital emergency department. This is because
many of the contacts were antenatal patients and
would have been vaccinated previously or discussed
vaccination. The hospital was more likely to have
up-to-date contact details. Contacts may have been
more co-operative and receptive to advice given
that they were pregnant and have an ongoing
relationship with the hospital. This contrasts with
the more usual situation where contacts of measles
cases are identified from an emergency department
or waiting room exposure or, for instance, airplane
contact. In such situations it can take considerable
time to obtain lists of contacts, then even more time
for PHU staff to follow–up. Such contacts may be
less willing or able to cooperate with public health
measures than those in this case study, as they
may not have an established relationship with the
health service, or they may not have a particular
focus on possible risks to their health, compared
with that experienced by pregnant women.
The total cost of containment efforts of an Iowa
measles outbreak was US$142,452 (2004 US$).
Excluding costs that were not accounted for in this
case study (overheads, MMR vaccine and NHIG,
transport, the costs of the public information campaign and the costs incurred by the Public Health
Laboratory for Iowa) the figure for Iowa comes to
US$78 734.5 Contributors to this high cost were
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2 secondary cases and 3 vaccination clinics. Over
1,000 potential contacts were traced compared
with almost 1,400 contacts for the western Sydney
outbreak. Although no direct comparison can be
made, this calculation does suggest that the figure
of A$48,000 is an underestimate. The costs did not
include incident control team meetings, vehicle
and transport, overtime and time-in-lieu, liaison
with public health staff in other offices, preparation
of clinician and media alerts, time liaising with
infection control, clinical or laboratory staff, nor
the costs associated with post-outbreak activities
to finalise the investigations. Moreover, the total
figure would be much higher if the costs incurred
by all sectors of the health system including general practitioners, maternity unit staff, hospital
infection control, laboratory staff and emergency
departments contributing to the identification and
management of contacts were included.
Enhanced surveillance contributes to the increased
workload (and cost) created by a measles outbreak.
During the period 25 February to 16 April 2011,
16 suspected but subsequently excluded cases of
measles were reported to the Parramatta PHU. In
the context of enhanced surveillance, these were
considered sufficiently suspicious to be extensively
followed-up. In addition, it is worth noting that
many other suspected cases were reported to the
Parramatta PHU (as well as to the Penrith PHU,
which services the immediately adjacent population) but were excluded after initial investigation.
The time taken to deal with the results of the
increased awareness and reporting of suspect cases
adds to the overall costs of the outbreak, particularly as heightened awareness can last for some
time beyond the final case.
Neither this case study nor the Iowa study investigated opportunity costs in regards to resources
utilised in responding to an infectious disease
outbreak. Clinical staff administering PEP were
removed from attending to other patients and
PHU infectious diseases staff were occupied with
measles cases and contact management with little
time to work on other tasks or projects.
Conclusions
Costs associated with public health interventions
should be assessed to ensure value for money,
appropriate resource allocation and value for the
community. Measles is a re-emerging disease of
public health significance in Australia and considerable time and resources are invested in striving to
control an outbreak. Maintaining Australia’s measles elimination status requires extensive effort in
outbreak control to reduce the number of secondary cases, their consequent morbidity and health
care costs. However, of much more importance is
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a robust measles vaccination strategy that achieves
high level coverage, thus preventing outbreaks in
the event of an imported case. Recent initiatives to
improve 2-dose measles vaccine coverage, including amendments to the Public Health Act 2010 in
New South Wales to require the presentation of
immunisation documentation for entry into childcare and bringing forward the 2nd MMR dose
to 18 months of age should improve population
immunity for measles and reduce the risk of future
outbreaks.
The PHU was unable to immediately contact
more than 10 per cent of the notified contacts, but
through examining records of hospital admission
and attendance it was determined that there were
no secondary cases amongst these contacts during
the period in which PEP would have been effective, suggesting that current population immunity
is high enough to prevent sustained transmission.
One benefit of the outbreak has been collaboration
between members of the local Pacific Islander
community and the PHU to provide catch-up vaccination and community education about immunisation in Australia.
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